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ESSAY

NEW WINE IN OLD WINESKINS:
METAPHOR AND LEGAL RESEARCH
Amy E. Sloan* & Colin Starger**
And no one puts new wine into old wineskins; otherwise, the wine will
burst the skins, and the wine is lost, and so are the skins; but one puts new
1
wine into fresh wineskins.
INTRODUCTION
Language gives and language takes away. Words can facilitate our
thoughts, but so too can they calcify our thinking. Recall the 1980s critique
of using male-only pronouns to refer to people generically. (“When a
judge decides, he exercises power”; “When a politician wins, he is happy”).
Feminists argued that this linguistic practice systematically excluded
women and reinforced suspect patriarchal norms. Though debates raged
2
for years, the critique rightly won the day and transformed our discourse.
Today insisting on male-only pronouns seems sexist and as socially
regressive as referring to African-Americans as “coloreds.”

© 2016 Amy E. Sloan & Colin Starger. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may
reproduce and distribute copies of this Essay in any format, at or below cost, for educational
purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the
Notre Dame Law Review Online, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
*
Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law. Thanks go to Linda Berger,
Peggy Cooper-Davis, Linda Edwards, Ruth Anne Robbins, and Michael R. Smith for
comments on earlier drafts and to Nathaniel Shyovitz and Laura Cress for research
assistance.
** Associate Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law. Principal, SCOTUS
Mapping Project. J.D. Columbia Law School, 2002.
1 Mark 2:22 (New Revised Standard Version); see also Matthew 9:17.
2 See, e.g., ANNE PAUWELS, WOMEN CHANGING LANGUAGE 225 (1998); Judith D.
Fischer, Framing Gender: Federal Appellate Judges’ Choices About Gender-Neutral
Language, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 473 (2009).
1
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The perils of language become especially acute in the realm of
3
metaphor. Metaphors are inescapable at certain levels of abstraction. As
philosophers have long recognized, we construct our conceptual world
4
using metaphors, and we cannot intellectually function without them. Yet
sometimes our concepts are flawed and our metaphors do damage.
Consider, for example, the War on Drugs. The policy is a recognized
disaster—millions have gone to prison, communities have suffered, and
5
still our very real drug problems remain unsolved. Partial blame for the
6
disaster lies with the war metaphor. It encouraged a military solution to a
7
problem that may need a civilian public health response.
This Essay examines a different set of metaphors currently doing
damage in law. Though not as life-and-death dramatic as the War on
Drugs or the struggle against patriarchy, these metaphors affect every law
student and practicing lawyer. What’s more, our examination implicates
broader philosophical issues that resonate well beyond specifically legal
discourse. The metaphors we examine pertain to legal research—how we
conceptualize the task of “finding law” to make arguments and solve legal
problems. The broader philosophical issues concern changes wrought by
technology.
When technology radically alters our material world,
sometimes our conceptual world fails to adjust. To successfully evolve, we
must interrogate and change our deepest metaphors. This Essay undertakes
this foundational task in the brave new world of legal research.
Our interest is both practical and theoretical. One of us is a research
8
scholar. While working on a new edition of a research textbook, this
author unexpectedly struggled to integrate technologies like Google
Scholar and the latest versions of Westlaw and Lexis into the textbook’s
framework. Upon reflection, this author grasped that the framework itself
was outdated; she needed a different metaphor to explain legal research.
This left her slack-jawed. Never before had she realized that metaphors
framed her very understanding of the research process she otherwise knew
so intimately.
3 See infra Part I (explaining the inherent necessary relationship between conceptual
analysis and metaphor).
4 See infra Part I (surveying philosophical and scientific literature on metaphor).
5 See Susan Stuart, War as Metaphor and the Rule of Law in Crisis: The Lessons We
Should Have Learned from the War on Drugs, 36 S. ILL. U. L.J. 1, 13–14 (2011).
6 See id. at 35–41.
7 Instead of directing the police to bring overwhelming force into enemy territory, we
should figure out the causes of the disease of drug addiction and treat them accordingly. See
Douglas B. Marlowe, Effective Strategies for Intervening with Drug Abusing Offenders, 47
VILL. L. REV. 989, 1024 (2002).
8 AMY E. SLOAN, BASIC LEGAL RESEARCH: TOOLS AND STRATEGIES (6th ed. 2015)
[hereinafter SLOAN, BASIC LEGAL RESEARCH]; see also AMY E. SLOAN, RESEARCHING THE
LAW: FINDING WHAT YOU NEED WHEN YOU NEED IT (2014) [hereinafter SLOAN,
RESEARCHING THE LAW].
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The theoretical stakes of this legal-research-metaphor quest are also
9
apparent. One of us is a jurisprudence scholar. After learning about the
research-metaphor quest, this author was struck by how it flipped an old
jurisprudential debate. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the law
10
was often characterized as “a seamless web.”
Then the Realists
successfully attacked this conception, dooming the law-as-seamless-web
11
metaphor.
Did changes to research mean resurrection of this dead
metaphor was imminent? After all, technology has created a new home for
law on a web. This web is hyperlinked rather than seamless, but it gives
the law a radically open and infinitely accessible new form. The theoretical
question is whether this new form will also change the law’s fundamental
nature.
This Essay argues that conceptualizing emerging legal technologies
using inherited research metaphors is like pouring new wine in old
wineskins—it simply doesn’t work. When a primary challenge of research
was physically gathering hidden and expensive information, metaphors
based on journey, acquisition, and excavation helped make sense of the
research process. But new, technologically-driven search methods have
burst those conceptual wineskins. The Internet and Big Data make
information cheap and easily accessible. The old metaphors fail.
At the same time, technology has not made legal research a selfexecuting or self-evident task. Real and serious challenges remain for
novice and expert legal researchers alike. Indeed, now that legal
information is cheap and abundant, the pressing problem is “information
12
overload.” We practically drown in search results, and the challenge is
holding back the floodwaters or just staying afloat. Choose your metaphor.
Actually, that is precisely what we do in this Essay. After examining the
practical and theoretical dimensions of the problem, we propose to replace
outdated research metaphors with updated metaphors that can provide the
fresh wineskin to conceptualize current research challenges.
9 See, e.g., Colin Starger, Constitutional Law and Rhetoric, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
(forthcoming 2016); Colin Starger, The DNA of an Argument: A Case Study in Legal Logos,
99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1045 (2009). Professor Starger’s work on “doctrinal
mapping” also lies at the intersection of technology and legal research. See The Supreme
Court Mapping Project, UNIV. OF BALT. SCH. OF LAW, law.ubalt.edu/faculty/scotusmapping/index.cfm (last visited Sept. 6, 2016).
10 Ethan Katsh, Law in a Digital World: Computer Networks and Cyberspace, 38
VILL. L. REV. 403, 403–05 (1993). This metaphor expressed confidence that all areas of the
law fit together smoothly in a coherent logical system that evolved according to a rational
plan. This epitomized what Grant Gilmore famously called “The Age of Faith.” GRANT
GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 41 (1977).
11 See Katsh, supra note 10, at 404.
12 See Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its
Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 442 n.111 (2003)
(collecting sources on information overload theory).
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The remainder of this Essay proceeds as follows. Part I introduces the
basic tenets and constructs of conceptual metaphor theory. In Part II, we
apply this theoretical lens to identify dominant metaphors structuring our
concepts of legal research. Part III explains how today’s dominant
conceptual metaphors have become outdated given technological advances.
Part IV reimagines one of the traditional metaphors, and then Part V
proposes new metaphors for legal research. Finally, we conclude by
reflecting on how our inquiry into legal research metaphors affects our
understanding of law itself.
I.

CONCEPTUAL METAPHOR THEORY

Most of us learned about metaphor in elementary or middle school.
Our teachers introduced metaphor as a figure of speech—a simile without
the “like.” No longer does this simple understanding suffice. Metaphor is
13
now appreciated as a complex theoretical phenomenon.
It commands
serious attention by psychologists, linguists, anthropologists, cognitive
14
scientists, philosophers, and even legal theorists. The field is vast, and
metaphor theory comes in many different flavors. This Essay, however,
focuses on the variation known as Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT).
CMT burst onto the scene in 1980 when George Lakoff and Mark
15
Johnson published Metaphors We Live By.
In this slim yet profound
book, Lakoff and Johnson radically reimagined the role metaphor plays in
language, experience, and understanding. Where prior theorists had
regarded metaphor “as characteristic of language alone, a matter of words,”
Lakoff and Johnson found that “metaphor is pervasive in everyday life, not
16
just in language but in thought and action.”
Metaphor was no longer
conceived as a mere figurative tool to express concepts in language.
Rather, Lakoff and Johnson showed how metaphor actually constitutes
17
concepts and shapes the development of ideas. Analysis of metaphor thus

13 See L. DAVID RITCHIE, METAPHOR (2013) (surveying contemporary metaphor
theory); see also METAPHOR AND THOUGHT (Andrew Ortony ed., 2d ed. 1979) (presenting an
interesting survey of pre-contemporary metaphor theory).
14 See, e.g., KEN BAAKE, METAPHOR AND KNOWLEDGE: THE CHALLENGES OF WRITING
SCIENCE 68–71 (2003) (discussing metaphor in science); RITCHIE, supra note 13 (surveying
metaphor theory in linguistics and psychology). For explorations of metaphor in the legal
context, see STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW, LIFE, AND MIND 43–68
(2001) (discussing metaphor drawing from interdisciplinary fields); David T. Ritchie, The
Centrality of Metaphor in Legal Analysis and Communication: An Introduction, 58 MERCER
L. REV. 839, 840 (2007) (introducing entire symposium issue on “Using Metaphor in Legal
Analysis and Communication”).
15 GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY (1980).
16 Id. at 3.
17 See generally id.
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became a tool to understand the deep structure of complex conceptual
systems.
Law is obviously a complex conceptual system. So too is legal
research. CMT therefore suggests that metaphor helps us structure,
18
comprehend, and navigate these systems. More than this, CMT predicts
that our understanding of legal research will directly affect how we
conceptualize law. This is because we actually experience what law is, at
least in part, through the legal research process. At least, so goes the
theory. To grasp how this sheds light on our practice, we must briefly
survey the theory’s foundations.
First, let us define some terms. Every metaphor involves two
elements—“topic” and “vehicle.” The topic is what the metaphor
19
describes, and the vehicle is how the metaphor describes the topic.
Recall, for example, Forrest Gump’s famous aphorism “life is a box of
20
chocolates.”
“Life” is the topic of Forrest’s metaphor and “box of
chocolates” is his vehicle. Box of chocolates explains a way of
understanding life.
Next, let us distinguish between “linguistic metaphors” and
“conceptual metaphors.” Linguistic metaphors are written or spoken in
language. “Life is a box of chocolates” is a linguistic metaphor that
appeared in the film Forrest Gump. Conceptual metaphors, by contrast,
operate at a deep level of consciousness. Conceptual metaphors help
“structure what we perceive, how we get around in the world, and how we
21
relate to other people.” They do not necessarily appear fully formed in
everyday language, but metaphorical language can provide surface
22
evidence of underlying conceptual metaphors.
A critical difference between linguistic and conceptual metaphors
relates to topic and vehicle. In a linguistic metaphor, the topic is described

18 See Mark L. Johnson, Mind, Metaphor, Law, 58 MERCER L. REV. 845, 845 (2007)
(“[C]ognitive science ought to give us insight into the nature of legal concepts and legal
reasoning.”).
19 See RITCHIE, supra note 13, at 10–11. Other common terms for the “topic” of a
metaphor include “tenor” or “target.” A common alternative term for “vehicle” is “basis.”
Id. Though not widely accepted, even more evocative terms can be used to refer to topic
and vehicle: “theme” and “phoros.” See CHAIM PERELMAN, THE REALM OF RHETORIC 114–
15 (William Kluback trans., 1982).
20 The precise quote is “Life is like a box of chocolates.” Forrest Gump Summary,
A M.
FILM
INST.
(emphasis
added),
http://www.afi.com/members/catalog/AbbrView.aspx?s=&Movie=55201 (last visited Feb.
18, 2016). We have taken poetic license to simplify the illustration. Similes are really a
species of metaphor with the same topic/vehicle structure.
21 LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 15, at 3.
22 See id.
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or explained by the vehicle. In a conceptual metaphor, the “topic is
23
experienced as the vehicle.”
If this seems abstract, consider a concrete example. Lakoff and
Johnson catalog various conceptual metaphors rooted in spatial orientation
24
including HAPPY IS UP and SAD IS DOWN. The CMT claim is that our very
concepts of “happy” and “sad” are partially shaped by our experiences of
25
“up” and “down.” We see evidence for this claim in common expressions
such as “I’m feeling up” and “[m]y spirits rose,” as well as in “I’m feeling
26
down” and “[m]y spirits sank.”
Note how the italicized words in the previous sentence don’t form
complete linguistic metaphors.
Rather they express underlying
metaphorical concepts. Sometimes conceptual metaphors operate so
deeply that even perceiving surface language as metaphorical presents
challenges. Though it seems fair enough to assert that one does not
literally fall in a depression, one could be forgiven for resisting the notion
that “cheer up” is metaphorical at all. Isn’t the phrase just an expression?
“No,” answers CMT. It is not coincidence or convention that our language
has so many phrases that resonate with HAPPY IS UP and SAD IS DOWN.
Rather, our language reflects a system of concepts shaped by our
27
experiences.
The CMT account follows from research in psychology, cognitive
science, and related disciplines and is fundamentally developmental in
nature. Lakoff and Johnson regard conceptual metaphors as “embodied,”
meaning they originate when an abstract topic (say affection) is repeatedly
28
experienced through the vehicle of a physical sensation (say warmth).
Even before the acquisition of language, certain concepts like AFFECTION IS
WARMTH become encoded in our basic understanding of the world. Later
this concept finds expression in language like “we have a warm
relationship” or “why are you being so cold to me?”
CMT does not ground all conceptual metaphors in direct physical
experience. However, the most basic embodied concepts—“primary”

RITCHIE, supra note 13, at 68.
LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 15, at 15. By convention, conceptual metaphors
are written in large and small capital letters. We follow that convention in this Essay.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 See WINTER, supra note 14, at 47 (“[L]anguage is neither entirely arbitrary nor
merely socially contingent, but grounded in our embodiment and motivated by our
interactions with the physical and social world.”).
28 See RITCHIE, supra note 13, at 69; see also GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON,
PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH: THE EMBODIED MIND AND ITS CHALLENGE TO WESTERN
THOUGHT 77 (1999).
23
24
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29

metaphors—do form this way in early infancy.
Vehicles for primary
metaphors are experiences like “heat and cold, absence and presence” of a
caregiver, “hunger and thirst, pain and pleasure, eating and drinking, light
and sound, physical orientation (up/down, front/back), and manipulating
30
objects.”
These sensory experiences provide the basis for conceptual metaphors
that express more abstract concepts like love, caring, and need or desire
in terms of fundamental physiological experiences . . . . In addition to
LOVE IS PHYSICAL PROXIMITY (and WARMTH), there is also NEED or
31
DESIRE IS HUNGER, as in “starved for attention.”

Primary metaphors embody simple concepts like AWAKE IS UP (“Get up!”
“Rise and shine!”) or ASLEEP IS DOWN (“You fell asleep”, “The baby is
down.”).
As language and social interaction enter the picture, children develop
conceptual systems in more and more complicated ways. Yet metaphor
32
continues to structure how these concepts build upon each other. Prior
topics of conceptual metaphors become the vehicles grounding new
metaphors. Critically, children (and later adults) still experience these
vehicles as the basis for new conceptual topics—but the experience is more
33
cognitive than sensorial.
As children grow, their physical-cognitive
experiences allow them to conceptualize more and more complex
thoughts—from MORE IS UP to IDEAS ARE OBJECTS to LIFE IS A JOURNEY.
According to CMT, this concept-building-through-metaphor process never
ends even though we mature. It is a fundamental characteristic of how we
learn and think.
For purposes of this Essay, this 10,000-foot view of CMT suffices.
Our modest goal is to identify conceptual metaphors that structure our
understanding and instincts around legal research and law. Thus, we don’t
34
need detailed explorations of conceptual mapping or cognitive mechanics.

29 See Johnson, supra note 18, at 859 (citing Joseph E. Grady et al., Blending and
Metaphor, in METAPHOR IN COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS 101, 101–24 (Gerard J. Steen &
Raymond W. Gibbs, Jr. eds., 1999); Christopher Johnson, Metaphor vs. Conflation in the
Acquisition of Polysemy: The Case of See, in 152 CULTURAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL AND
TYPOLOGICAL ISSUES IN COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS: CURRENT ISSUES IN LINGUISTIC THEORY
155, 155–69 (Masako K. Hiraga et al. eds., 1997)) (discussing theory of primary metaphors
drawn on study of metaphor acquisition in young children).
30 RITCHIE, supra note 13, at 70.
31 Id.
32 See Johnson, supra note 18, at 864 (“Once we have primary metaphors, we are off
and running, so to speak. Through various types of blending and composition, we develop
vast coherent systems of metaphorically defined concepts.”).
33 See id. at 846.
34 See supra notes 28–29.
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Before moving on, however, we do need to emphasize a final and vital
theoretical point. In Lakoff and Johnson’s words:
The very systematicity that allows us to comprehend one aspect of a
concept in terms of another . . . will necessarily hide other aspects of the
concept. In allowing us to focus on one aspect of a concept . . . a
metaphorical concept can keep us from focusing on other aspects of the
35
concept that are inconsistent with that metaphor.
36

Lakoff and Johnson call this phenomenon “[h]iding.”
Hiding is not necessarily bad. As we conceptualize and reason, hiding
can help by reducing distraction and focusing our attention. However,
when our conceptual metaphors become outmoded, hiding can inhibit and
constrain our thinking without our ever realizing it. In situations where
conceptual change is needed to catch up with events on the ground, hidden
37
metaphors potentially calcify thinking and stifle innovation.
II.

OLD WINESKINS: CURRENT RESEARCH METAPHORS

Although the concept of “legal research” necessarily implicates a
38
concept of “law,” this Essay confines its primary interrogation of
conceptual metaphors to those animating our understanding of “legal
research.” This limitation on scope is justified because the process of
research—locating documents that are classified as legal information used
to accomplish lawyering tasks such as advising clients, litigating cases, and
engaging in scholarly analysis—is theoretically distinct from the nature of
39
law.
We therefore ask: What are our current primary conceptual

LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 15, at 10.
Id.
For a familiar example of hiding, consider how male-only pronouns stealthily
reinforce concepts like POLITICIANS ARE MALE.
38 It seems self-evident to us that law is a conceptual metaphor. Even though law
exists in the empirical world, “law” cannot be tasted, touched, seen, heard, or smelled.
Similarly, though we understand law through experience, our experience of law is not
directly visceral like hunger or directly primal like fear. Instead, we experience law as a
concept (more accurately, a family of concepts) built upon other concepts/experiences.
Given this, CMT teaches that primary metaphors for law will inevitably structure and enable
more complex secondary metaphors.
39 To be precise, legal research depends only on a narrow and circular concept of law
as “that which can be discovered by legal research.” In other words, as far as legal research
is concerned, the only law that matters is the law found through legal research. While this
can be said to implicate a rather positivist understanding of law as inherently written-down
and therefore discoverable, the point is that understanding metaphors for legal research does
not require a complete understanding of the full metaphorical nature of law in our society.
For more on how our concepts of research might actually affect our concepts of law (instead
of the other way around), see infra Conclusion.
35
36
37
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metaphors for legal research? How are these metaphors expressed (or
hidden) in legal research literature?
The most ubiquitous metaphors in legal research are RESEARCH IS A
JOURNEY, RESEARCH IS EXCAVATION, and RESEARCH IS ACQUISITION.
These metaphors originally arose from literal descriptions of the physical
process of research. Seeking information, researchers journeyed to a
library, excavated mountains of text in books, and acquired reams of paper.
Our current understanding of research remains framed by the conceptual
metaphors born of this physical experience.
A brief survey of
representative legal research literature demonstrates how deeply embedded
these metaphors are.
Perhaps the most common conceptual metaphor for research is
RESEARCH IS A JOURNEY. This concept mainly finds linguistic expression
through navigation metaphors: following a map; being lost; finding one’s
way. The journey metaphor conceptualizes the experience of research as a
voyage through the unknown fraught with dangers and detours for the
unwary traveler. Consider this wonderful example:
Early seafarers were justifiably frightened of terra incognita. Maps
covered known areas; unknown areas were marked “Here there be
dragons.” Perhaps some legal researchers feel similarly. One of us
remembers with pain the securities assignment she had as a summer
associate—she might as well have been sailing without chart or
compass for all she knew about securities terminology and sources.
But, happily, researchers seldom need to venture into territory that is
totally unexplored. Others have explored most areas of legal research
40
and have left behind signposts and maps to guide those who follow.

While this passage makes clear that the authors are consciously
deploying a linguistic metaphor to conceptualize research, many other
descriptions of research are less explicit, potentially hiding the journey
metaphor. Thus, writers refer to researching “the appropriate universe of
41
relevant cases” or in “familiar territory.”
General advice about research calls on the journey metaphor both in
describing challenges and proposing solutions to those challenges.
Research challenges arise when researchers cannot find sources “pointing
42
in the right direction.” A researcher who feels as if she has “reached a
40 Peggy Roebuck Jarrett & Mary Whisner, “Here There Be Dragons”: How to Do
Research in an Area You Know Nothing About, 6 PERSP.: TEACHING LEGAL RES. & WRITING
74, 74 (1998) (emphasis added). Perspectives: Teaching Legal Research and Writing is a
publication focused on teaching ideas for legal research and writing.
41 Jo Anne Durako, Building Confidence and Competence in Legal Research Skills:
Step by Step, 5 PERSP.: TEACHING LEGAL RES. & WRITING 87, 91 (1997) (emphasis added).
42 Marsha L. Baum, Ten Tips for Moving Beyond the Brick Wall in the Legal
Research Process, 10 PERSP.: TEACHING LEGAL RES. & WRITING 20, 20 (2001) (emphasis
added).
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dead end and cannot determine the next step to take” may have “reached
the end of the research trail” and have no need to pursue a “secondary
43
route.” A common research frustration is feeling as though one has “hit a
44
‘brick wall’ . . . and see[s] no other avenue to take.” Novice researchers
45
are cautioned not to “get sidetracked” so that they “avoid getting lost in
46
the vast array of information.”
Advice about specific research practices similarly incorporates the
idea that RESEARCH IS A JOURNEY. For instance, an online table of contents
may be harder “to navigate” than a print version. A researcher may have to
follow multiple steps “to arrive at the desired destination,” increasing the
47
chance that he “will lose track of where [he is] along the way.”
Conducting case research with a state digest “almost always gets us in the
48
right neighborhood.”
These are just a few examples illustrating the
ubiquity of the metaphor.
RESEARCH IS EXCAVATION is a second common conceptual metaphor
used to describe and understand legal research. This metaphor finds
linguistic expression through images of digging: mining for gold or
precious gems; or “unearth[ing] those fossils of prior disputes that are legal
49
opinions.”
This metaphor captures the notion of searching deeply for
treasure and conveys a sense of the excitement of discovery:
The process of legal research is often compared to a treasure hunt—
the search for that special gem that will bring the researcher wealth
and happiness if found. Of course, no treasure hunt will be successful
unless the students know what they are seeking. . . . Once they
appreciate the precedential value of primary authorities, then and only
then can they enjoy the excitement of the hunt and the thrill of the
50
find.

Most references to excavation are not as direct as the example above.
Though incorporating the same concept, the actual expression often hides
Id. at 21 (emphasis added).
Id. at 20 (emphasis added); see also Durako, supra note 41, at 88 (describing “dead
ends” in research).
45 Baum, supra note 42 (emphasis added).
46 Id. (emphasis added).
47 Patrick Meyer, Think Before You Type: Observations of an Online Researcher, 13
PERSP.: TEACHING LEGAL RES. & WRITING 19, 21 (2004) (emphasis added).
48 Judy Meadows & Kay Todd, Our Question—Your Answers, 9 PERSP.: TEACHING
LEGAL RES. & WRITING 16, 16 (2000) (emphasis added).
49 Olivia Farrar & A.G. Harmon, Lawyering Outside Lawsuits: Incorporating
Negotiations, Settlements, and Mediations into the Legal Writing Curriculum, 19 PERSP.:
TEACHING LEGAL RES. & WRITING 42 (2010) (emphasis added).
50 Donald J. Dunn, Why We Should Teach Primary Material First, 8 PERSP.:
TEACHING LEGAL RES. & WRITING 10, 11 (1999) (emphasis added); see also Mary
Dunnewold, How Many Cases Do I Need?, 10 PERSP.: TEACHING LEGAL RES. & WRITING
10, 10 (2001) (discussing precedent “unearthed” in research (emphasis added)).
43
44
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its metaphorical quality. For example, we “drill down from broader to
51
more specific topics.” We describe specific sources as “gold mines of
52
information.” Additionally, images of research results as gems abound.
53
54
An inquiry “nets research gems” or “gems of information.” Publishers
55
“include little gems of information.”
The third and final dominant metaphor used today to conceptualize
legal research is RESEARCH IS ACQUISITION. The acquisition concept
concerns collecting materials and reaping the rewards of labor. This
concept often surfaces through two sub-metaphors—harvest (gathering the
fruits of one’s work in the fields) and shopping (buying things from a
store). Both sub-metaphors express different aspects of the general concept
of RESEARCH IS ACQUISITION.
The harvest motif finds typical expression in an article entitled
56
Harvesting Relevant Cases on Lexis and Westlaw: Comparing Results.
57
“Yield” is a virtually universal term used to describe research results:
“Don’t assume that following a headnote from one case in one system will
58
yield all the relevant cases. Use many seed cases.” Gathering is another
consistent image, illustrated by references to “collecting a wide array of

51 Joanne Dugan, Choosing the Right Tool for Internet Searching: Search Engines vs.
Directories, 14 PERSP.: TEACHING LEGAL RES. & WRITING 111, 113 (2006) (emphasis
added).
52 Jarrett & Whisner, supra note 40 (emphasis added).
53 Susan King & Ruth Anne Robbins, Creating New Learning Experiences Through
Collaborations Between Law Librarians and Legal Writing Faculty, 11 PERSP.: TEACHING
LEGAL RES. & WRITING 110, 112 (2003) (emphasis added).
54 Dugan, supra note 51 (emphasis added).
55 Ellen M. Callinan, Legal Research and the Summer Job . . . Advice from the Law
Firm, 7 PERSP.: TEACHING LEGAL RES. & WRITING 110, 114 (1999) (emphasis added).
56 Mary Whisner, Harvesting Relevant Cases on Lexis and Westlaw: Comparing
Results, 20 PERSP.: TEACHING LEGAL RES. & WRITING 31 (2011).
57 Susan Hanley Kosse & David T. ButleRitchie, Putting One Foot in Front of the
Other: The Importance of Teaching Text-Based Research Before Exposing Students to
Computer-Assisted Legal Research, 9 PERSP.: TEACHING LEGAL RES. & WRITING 69, 69
(2001) (noting that print and online research yield different information); Ellie Margolis &
Kristen Murray, Teaching Research Using an Information Literacy Paradigm, 22 PERSP.:
TEACHING LEGAL RES. & WRITING 101, 105 (2014) (noting that, with new search engines,
“even a poorly constructed search will yield something” (emphasis added)); Steven R.
Miller, Teaching Advanced Electronic Legal Research for the Modern Practice of Law, 9
PERSP.: TEACHING LEGAL RES. & WRITING 120, 122 (2001) (describing an assignment with
the goal of forcing “students to think of what resources would yield the text of local
ordinances” (emphasis added)); Ronald E. Wheeler, Teaching WestlawNext: Next Steps for
Teachers of Legal Research, 21 PERSP.: TEACHING LEGAL RES. & WRITING 127, 129 (2013)
(comparing a search that “yields over 5,000 results from 12 different sources” with one that
“yields only 51 results” (emphasis added)).
58 Whisner, supra note 56, at 31 (emphasis added).
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59

resources.” Fruit, fruitfulness, and fruitlessness are common themes as
60
well. Lawyers communicate “the fruits of their research.” Use of a legal
61
dictionary can prevent a “few hours of fruitless research.”
By contrast, images of shopping suggest a more urban-focused take on
the RESEARCH IS ACQUISITION concept. Harvest contemplates starting from
something small (a seed) that grows into something larger (fruit).
Shopping represents choosing from among a selection of pre-stocked items.
Still, both metaphors reflect the notion of adding through acquisition.
62
Loose-leaf services are described as offering “one-stop shopping.” Other
63
sources may also be described as providing “one-stop-shopping,” and the
idea of research as a consumer shopping experience has been explored
64
elsewhere.
At their core, excavation and acquisition metaphors both
conceptualize research as starting with nothing and then expending effort—
in mines, on farms, or in stores—to locate something unique and valuable.
We note that these metaphors can successfully join with the navigation
metaphor. Consider the following description of a student research
assignment:
I had resisted the temptation to conduct preliminary research so that I
knew what students would find and could direct them more easily to
fruitful paths.
I wanted students to experience the sense of
disorientation and possibility that comes when a legal professional
receives an open-ended, collaborative assignment and must, working
65
with a group, choose and prioritize research paths.

This particular mixing of linguistic metaphors manifests the
underlying concept of research as journey of acquisition. It thus helps
clarify that research is not merely a touristic kind of sightseeing journey.
Neither is research an exercise in window-shopping. It is an activity
59 Debora Person, Using Rule 11 Sanctions to Persuade First-Year Students to Focus
on Legal Research, 18 PERSP.: TEACHING LEGAL RES. & WRITING 143, 144 (2010) (emphasis
added); see also Callinan, supra note 55, at 113 (discussing research strategy built “around
the information you collect” (emphasis added)).
60 Charles Calleros, Traditional Office Memoranda and E-mail Memos, in Practice
and in the First Semester, 21 PERSP.: TEACHING LEGAL RES. & WRITING 105, 106 (2013)
(emphasis added); see also id. at 105 (defining an e-mail memo as a streamlined
“presentation of legal analysis—or at least the fruits of legal research” (emphasis added)).
61 Teresa C. Stanton, Finding Foreign Law: It’s Not Just for the Experts, 16 PERSP.:
TEACHING LEGAL RES. & WRITING 37, 37 (2007) (emphasis added).
62 Meadows & Todd, supra note 48, at 17 (emphasis added).
63 Stanton, supra note 61, at 39 (emphasis added) (describing the World Legal
Information Institute (WorldLII) as “practically a one-stop-shopping site”).
64 See Amy E. Sloan, Step Right Up: Using Consumer Decision Making Theory to
Teach Research Process in the Electronic Age, 60 S.C. L. REV. 123 (2008).
65 Tom Cobb, Public Interest Research, Collaboration, and the Promise of Wikis, 16
PERSP.: TEACHING LEGAL RES. & WRITING 1, 4–5 (2007) (emphasis added).
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undertaken to achieve tangible results necessary to complete lawyering
tasks.
III.

WINESKINS BURST: WHY CURRENT METAPHORS FAIL

Do our current metaphors for legal research still conceptualize the
process accurately? The short answer to this question is “yes and no.” To
understand why, recall that the conceptual metaphors identified above—
RESEARCH IS A JOURNEY, RESEARCH IS EXCAVATION, RESEARCH IS
ACQUISITION—all have direct origins in physical experience. To the extent
that those experiences still have meaning, the traditional metaphors aid our
understanding. But to the extent that technology has fundamentally
changed what research is, the traditional metaphors must give way.
The journey metaphor once reflected the visceral experience of
research as physical, linear movement. Though now a distant memory for
some, the practice up until the dawn of the twenty-first century required
researchers literally to journey through labyrinthine stacks to locate
information. Even non-print research required physical movement through
spatially separated destinations. In the early days, users needed to walk to
66
special terminals in the library to conduct online searches. Success in this
environment required mapping out sources that were likely to have useful
information, plotting a path through the sources in a particular order, and
trying to avoid detours into irrelevant or out-of-date sources.
The excavation and acquisition metaphors similarly emerged from
empirical experience. A researcher faced with a legal problem began with
no information—an empty folder in her hands. She would then gather
sources (in print and/or online) and “dig” by reading the content. She
could “shop” for information with a loose-leaf service bringing together
multiple authorities in a specific area of the law. Or she could go to the
“store” (the library or online) and select from among a range of documents.
Importantly, such digging and acquiring was expensive both in terms of
time and money. Lifting books off library shelves took precious time.
Making copies of such treasures required money.
Times have changed.
Technology has fundamentally altered how we do research. Trips to
the library are no longer required for most research tasks. Spatially,
information is at our fingertips—accessible through a desktop, a laptop, a
tablet, or a phone. We don’t even have to get out of our chairs. Linear
movement is no longer required.

66 For more on the transition from print to online legal research, see generally Carol
M. Bast & Ransford C. Pyle, Legal Research in the Computer Age: A Paradigm Shift?, 93
LAW LIBR. J. 285 (2001); Thomas Keefe, Teaching Legal Research from the Inside Out, 97
LAW LIBR. J. 117 (2005); Theodore A. Potter, A New Twist on an Old Plot: Legal Research
Is a Strategy, Not a Format, 92 LAW LIBR. J. 287 (2000).
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Moreover, the foundational knowledge needed for a person to acquire
legal information has changed.
Research used to require some
understanding of the hierarchy and structure of the law to select a proper
67
source to search. Now powerful search engines can search everything at
once. These days, almost no physical effort or time is required to identify
pages and pages of legal content. Further, text is now hypertext. We can
connect documents in myriad individualized ways, not only through preestablished linear steps. This has substantially undermined the literal bases
for the (traditionally understood) journey metaphor.
Technology has likewise undermined the literal bases for the
excavation and acquisition metaphors. The reality of today’s online
ecosystems means that information is no longer hidden, scarce, or
expensive to collect. Information is accessible and plentiful. Hypertext
allows us to connect and navigate complex networks of documents with
ease. And practically limitless cloud-based storage makes all of this
information virtually free to save and keep.
The overriding challenge today is limiting this vast universe of cheap
results.
We can use fee-based specialized services like Lexis and Westlaw,
stripped-down, less expensive services like FastCase, or even completely
free services like Google that offer large volumes of legal information to
68
anyone. Yet although potential researchers need not know anything about
the law or have money to spend before they can acquire legal information,
research in today’s environment is not necessarily easier or more reliable.
Content without context is useless. Information overwhelms us, and we
struggle to sort what is useful from what is not.
It is thus apparent that technology has undermined traditional research
metaphors. Because key aspects of these metaphors no longer resonate, we
must both repurpose the traditional metaphors (where possible) and identify
new metaphors to better facilitate conceptual understanding of the research
process, as it actually exists today.

67 This baseline “knowledge of source” applied equally to print sources and early
online databases. Though Westlaw and Lexis now use a Google-like search bar, prior
versions limited searches to particular sources of law.
68 The following are just a few examples of websites that provide free access to legal
information:
Legal
Information
Institute,
CORNELL
UNIV.
LAW
SCH.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2016); Caselaw Access Project, THE
HARVARD LAW SCH. LIBRARY, http://lil.law.harvard.edu/projects/caselaw-access-project
(last visited Sept. 23, 2016); FREE LAW PROJECT, https://free.law/ (last visited Sept. 15,
2016); COURT LISTENER, https://www.courtlistener.com/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2016);
CASETEXT, https://casetext.com/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2016); FINDLAW,
http://www.findlaw.com/
(last
visited
Sept.
15,
2016);
WIKIPEDIA,
https://www.wikipedia.org/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2016).
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REIMAGINING THE RESEARCH JOURNEY

Does any conceptual vitality remain in the current metaphors for legal
research? Or has technology completely rendered old concepts obsolete?
In our view, only one traditional metaphor—RESEARCH IS A JOURNEY—
retains appeal, and then only if it is reimagined. On the other hand,
RESEARCH IS EXCAVATION and ACQUISITION have been irretrievably
undermined by technology. These metaphors now mask more than they
reveal about the process of research and should be set aside.
RESEARCH IS A JOURNEY resonates still because research remains a
voyage of discovery. Yet the particular type of journey imagined by the
traditional metaphor no longer represents the actual experience of the
modern researcher. In the traditional metaphor, the unplanned journey was
likened to wandering in the wilderness, sailing without a compass, heading
69
out on a trail into open space. To overcome these obstacles, the savvy
researcher knew the importance of picking a very specific path toward her
destination. More often than not, this path was linear. Researchers risked
getting lost by wandering off trail and venturing into uncharted and
potentially uninhabited territory.
Today’s research journey unfolds differently, and so the metaphor
needs reimagining. We now look for information in extremely crowded
landscapes rather than in wild, open spaces. We don’t traipse on foot
through unexplored territory so much as inch through congested traffic in
our cars—or perhaps speed along information superhighways, bypassing
large swaths of territory instantaneously. Since hyperlinks have opened up
countless new routes to our destination, we no longer need to follow a
single, linear path to get where we want to go. Nevertheless, we can still
get lost. Forget the wilderness; we should now fear the confusion that
results from wrong turns in frenetic cities with their dense and tangled
alleyways.
We thus propose to reimagine our research journey as one through a
crowded city rather than an open landscape. This creates new resonance
for the original metaphor. Exploring this new city-journey metaphor in
turn helps us re-conceptualize the challenges of the modern research
journey.
Consider first the promise and pitfall of modern legal search engines
that do not require users to choose a specific source to search. In one
sense, typing a legal search without specifying a source resembles plugging
an address into Google Maps without knowing which city we’re
navigating. Google Maps will inevitably pull up something, but we could
70
end up far from the place we want to be.
Similarly, the information
See supra notes 40–48 and accompanying text.
This basic scenario recently occurred in Iceland after an American tourist mistyped
a single letter in his Global Positioning System (GPS); he ended up travelling six hours over
69
70
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retrieved by legal search engines can lead us astray if we don’t properly
understand its context. Users may be able to conduct searches without
foundational knowledge of the legal system’s structures and hierarchies,
but uninformed users risk getting lost in their results.
Parallels also exist between our understanding of legal-research
technology and our understanding of physical-navigation devices. Today’s
search engines “drive” our research, but those of us who lack advanced
degrees in computer science cannot fully understand how these search
71
algorithms work. This may unnerve lawyers who want total control over
their research, but it is really no different from the way we interact with
Global Positioning System (GPS) devices. We enter addresses and follow
without any clue as to how our smart phones choose the routes they
suggest. Our modes of research and navigation both leverage technology
whose intricacies are beyond our ken.
Associating RESEARCH IS A JOURNEY with a different kind of trip thus
infuses the old metaphor with new relevance. The trip-through-a-crowdedcity reimagining both better reflects our contemporary experience of
research and improves the metaphor’s potential as a teaching tool. It is
therefore worthwhile to bring this metacognition to the metaphor.
Alas, the RESEARCH IS EXCAVATION and ACQUISITION metaphors are
not so effectively reimagined. The fundamental nothing-to-something
orientation of these metaphors makes them inadequate for conceptualizing
research in an age of overwhelming information. In our view, the
excavation and acquisition metaphors are tightly tethered to the physical
72
experience and time and money expenses that old-time research entailed.
Instead, we need new metaphors to effectively represent the process of
73
narrowing vast quantities of information.
icy roads to a remote part of the island and became a minor celebrity in the process. See
Dan Bilefsky, GPS Mix-Up Brings Wrong Turn, and Celebrity, to an American in Iceland,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/05/world/europe/icelandamerican-tourist-gps.html.
71 See Bob Berring, Legal Research Training’s End, SLAW (Oct. 31, 2011),
http://www.slaw.ca/2011/10/31/legal-research-training%e2%80%99s-end/ (comparing the
expectation that researchers will understand how today’s legal search engines work to
expecting drivers to understand how a car’s engine works); see also SLOAN, BASIC LEGAL
RESEARCH, supra note 8, at 268–79 (discussing variations in search results based on search
algorithms).
72 Though it is theoretically possible to reorient the excavation and harvest metaphors
to account for the quantities of information that researchers encounter today—imagine
panning for gold to separate the valuable nuggets from dross; separating the wheat from the
chaff—these attempts ultimately fall short. Unlike re-envisioning the journey that research
represents, repurposing the excavation and acquisition metaphors requires us to focus on
small subsets of what these literal activities entail and to ignore much of what these
metaphors represent. Instead, new metaphors can better capture the idea of filtering
suggested by “panning for gold” or “separating wheat from chaff.”
73 See infra notes 74–81 and accompanying text.
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INTRODUCING NEW METAPHORS

New metaphors for legal research must conceptualize the non-linear
ways we access and manage overwhelming quantities of information. At
the same time, new metaphors should retain those aspects of the traditional
metaphors that continue to resonate. We suggest three possible new
conceptual metaphors that meet these criteria: RESEARCH IS FILTERING,
RESEARCH IS CONVERSATION, and RESEARCH IS DANCING.
RESEARCH IS FILTERING avoids the linear and spatial difficulties of the
traditional journey metaphor without rejecting the concept of learning
something new. This metaphor also reverses outmoded notions underlying
excavation and acquisition because filtering focuses on eliminating
irrelevant information rather than collecting something from nothing.
RESEARCH IS FILTERING effectively frames the contemporary process
of narrowing volumes of legal information down to the subset necessary to
answer a legal question. Filtering can take different forms. Pre-search
filtering occurs when a researcher selects a jurisdiction before executing a
74
search to limit the scope of information retrieved.
Alternatively (or
additionally), filtering can occur post-search. After obtaining information,
the savvy researcher filters out irrelevant materials to focus on the most
75
factually relevant, most authoritative sources.
Framing the process this way makes clear that the more effective the
pre-filtering, the less post-search filtering the researcher will have to do.
Conversely, less effective pre-filtering (perhaps rooted in the researcher’s
own lack of prior knowledge about the law at issue) will require additional
76
labor through post-search filtering.
Importantly, the filtering metaphor
does not suggest that research requires following a rigid series of steps.
Instead, the metaphor implies a range of choices (some perhaps better than
others) from which the researcher can choose to filter (either pre- or postsearch) to reduce the quantity of information available to the relevant
77
subset.
RESEARCH IS CONVERSATION provides a different metaphor that also
avoids linear imagery while capturing the notions of an abundance of
information and of learning something new. In this conception, doing
research is like going into a room (or entering a chat) with many ongoing
74 See CYNTHIA F. ADCOCK ET AL., BUILDING ON BEST PRACTICES: TRANSFORMING
LEGAL EDUCATION IN A CHANGING WORLD 118 (Deborah Maranville et al. eds., 2015);
SLOAN, BASIC LEGAL RESEARCH, supra note 8, at 37; SLOAN, RESEARCHING THE LAW, supra
note 8, at 27–33.
75 See ADCOCK ET AL., supra note 74, at 118; SLOAN, BASIC LEGAL RESEARCH, supra
note 8, at 264–65; SLOAN, RESEARCHING THE LAW, supra note 8, at 46–48.
76 See ADCOCK ET AL., supra note 74; SLOAN, BASIC LEGAL RESEARCH, supra note 8,
at 38–41; SLOAN, RESEARCHING THE LAW, supra note 8, at 28, 46–47.
77 See ADCOCK ET AL., supra note 74, at 117–19; SLOAN, BASIC LEGAL RESEARCH,
supra note 8, at 33–41; SLOAN, RESEARCHING THE LAW, supra note 8, at 28–29.
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conversations.
The researcher must listen carefully to distinguish
background noise from substantive discussion. The researcher can do this
by listening to the most authoritative speakers or those whose conversation
most closely addresses the subject of the research.
One particularly appealing aspect of the conversation metaphor is how
it suggests that researchers will hear many voices. Expert researchers today
recognize the potentially immense value of searching beyond primary
authority and traditional secondary sources. Technology makes new
sources available—briefs and other court documents; blogs; information
posted by law firms, organizations, or individuals; Wikipedia; and crowdsourced content such as that provided by CaseText, to name just a few.
With so many voices offering views on the law, a researcher must listen
carefully to determine how much attention to give to any given speaker.
Assessing the credibility and authoritative value of source material has
long been a foundational skill in legal research, but it is an especially
78
important task given the ubiquity of information today. By reflecting that
aspect of research process, the conversation metaphor provides fodder for
research instruction and an apt frame for further thinking about
contemporary research challenges and opportunities. Just as conversation
invites a participant to listen and speak, today’s environment allows
researchers to find information and make their findings available to others
by posting on blogs or participating in crowd-sourced cite-checking
79
ventures.
The conversation metaphor recognizes the interactive and
social aspects of research process today.
RESEARCH IS DANCING is a third possible new conceptual metaphor.
It avoids the linear nature of the navigation metaphor and rightly
emphasizes research as an iterative process. Like dancing, research is not a
regimented march to a predetermined endpoint. Rather, research involves a
series of overlapping steps that create a pattern. Certain basic moves are
80
critical, repetition is necessary, but imagination is also important. The
dancing metaphor also frames the way today’s researchers must follow
links and move from item to item online to identify relevant information—
by incorporating the notion of orderly, yet flexible, movement. Whereas
the idea of “jumping” from source to source can seem random or
disorganized, a dance, while fluid, still has a discernable structure.

78 See ADCOCK ET AL., supra note 74, at 119 (citing Ellie Margolis & Kristen E.
Murray, Say Goodbye to the Books: Information Literacy as the New Legal Research
Paradigm, 38 U. DAYTON L. REV. 117, 131 (2012) (criticizing students’ ability to effectively
evaluate the weight of authority)).
79 See WeCite, CASETEXT, https://casetext.com/about/wecite (last visited Sept. 7,
2016) (WeCite is a community-sourced citator tool that helps explain relationships between
various cases.).
80 See SLOAN, RESEARCHING THE LAW, supra note 8, at 6–7.
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The dancing metaphor boasts special resonance in the context of
teaching research. If students experience research instruction as dictating a
rigid series of steps that do not fit with every research situation, they may
reject their instruction as unrealistic or unhelpful. Students can also
experience research as chaotic, feeling as though they found useful
81
information by accident rather than design.
Reframing the process
through RESEARCH IS DANCING has the potential to inspire greater
confidence. By reflecting a flexible yet orderly motion, the dance
metaphor captures both the skill and the artistry of effective research. It
also suggests that with practice and repetition, students can get the swing of
it.
Of course, RESEARCH IS FILTERING, RESEARCH IS CONVERSATION, and
RESEARCH IS DANCING are not the only metaphors that might help us
conceptualize research. And neither is any one of these metaphors beyond
critique. However, we see these metaphors as fundamentally useful ways
to reconceive the research landscape in light of changes wrought by
technology. Though not perfect, the filtering, conversation, and dancing
metaphors work in tandem to create a well-rounded understanding of
research process. Together, they form new wineskins better suited to hold
the wine of today’s research process.
CONCLUSION
What can our inquiry into legal research metaphors teach us about the
concept of law? This Essay has surfaced unwarranted assumptions
embedded in legal research metaphors; we now suggest that a key
overlapping metaphor for law is similarly outmoded. As we have shown,
the dominant metaphors RESEARCH IS A JOURNEY, RESEARCH IS
EXCAVATION, and RESEARCH IS ACQUISITION incorrectly conceive of
research as a linear process where legal information is hidden and scarce.
This Conclusion argues that the same obsolete assumptions plague an
overlapping metaphor for law—LAW IS TEXT.
To unpack this conclusion and its implications, consider first how
LAW IS TEXT overlaps with metaphors for legal research. Our explanation
starts with the observation that legal research typically has “law” as its
object. In other words, researchers typically seek “the law” or perhaps “the
best law for my client.” This can be expressed as the conceptual metaphor
LAW IS WHAT LEGAL RESEARCH REVEALS.
Anybody who has ever
conducted real-world legal research has literally experienced this concept.
Similarly, anyone who has ever conducted real-world legal research
has literally experienced the conceptual metaphor LAW IS TEXT because
“what legal research reveals” is text. Of course, researchers may call this
81 Everyone appreciates a lucky break while doing research, but we should never
teach students that RESEARCH IS A GAMBLE.
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text a statute, treaty, constitution, opinion, or some other authority. Yet,
whether saved online or inscribed in stone, all these sources of law and
commentary are committed to text. LAW IS TEXT is thus an essentially
positivist conceptual metaphor. It expresses the primary idea that positive
law is “the Word.” Given that legal research inherently seeks positive law,
LAW IS TEXT overlaps conceptually with LAW IS WHAT RESEARCH
REVEALS.
This metaphorical overlap has jurisprudential implications for our
concept of law. We can draw out these implications in two steps. First, we
apply this Essay’s findings regarding outmoded assumptions embedded in
research metaphors—linearity, obscurity, and scarcity—to the object of
legal research. This suggests three metaphors:
TEXT IS LINEAR
TEXT IS HIDDEN
TEXT IS SCARCE
Then, the second step applies a simple transitive logic. Because LAW
IS TEXT,
∴ LAW IS LINEAR
∴ LAW IS HIDDEN
∴ LAW IS SCARCE
Note that we do not claim that these metaphors for law are either
“true” or “false.” Instead, our logic suggests that these assumptions get
“baked into” our understanding of law at the conceptual level. Given that
many lawyers (and law students, professors, judges, and so forth)
experience what law is through research, the hidden assumptions about
research get baked into our concept of positive law.
Now, LAW IS LINEAR, LAW IS HIDDEN, and LAW IS SCARCE do make
sense when viewed from a historical perspective. Early law had an
unquestionably hierarchical nature—it flowed in a line from ruler to ruled.
Likewise, law clearly evolved as an elite discourse for those privileged few
who could read and write and access the rarefied world of law books. The
82
literal Word was hidden from most. Even today, the law retains the elite
and mysterious nature suggested by these metaphors. As a quick example,
imagine an average person (or lawyer!) reading an impenetrable cell phone
contract. This person certainly experiences that LAW IS HIDDEN.
What about technology? If technology challenges assumptions in our
metaphors for research, does technology also challenge our metaphors for
law? Now that research is non-linear and information is cheap and easy to
access, does our concept of law itself need to change?
Alas, the situation here is complicated. Our concept of law is not
univocal—we actually have different concepts of law. Put another way,

82 See Amy E. Sloan, The 95 Theses: Legal Research in the Internet Age, 20 J. LEGAL
WRITING INST. 45 (2015).
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is hardly the only conceptual metaphor for law in legal
discourse. Complications arise because technology has not affected all
conceptual metaphors equally or at all. Consider just two alternative
metaphors (we can imagine more): LAW IS AUTHORITY and LAW IS A GAME.
While technology may have affected the nature of law’s authority and/or
the rules of law’s game, it is far beyond the scope of this Essay to
scrutinize those effects. We therefore cannot make categorical statements
about how technology challenges our concept(s) of law. It is clear, on the
other hand, that the nature of LAW IS TEXT has changed. At the very least,
our concept of positive law should account for this change.
It is tempting to imagine the change wrought by technology as making
positive law less rigidly hierarchical, elite, and mysterious. Now that
modern research permits non-linear movement through instantly accessible
legal sources, the text of law itself may “feel” more open. With legal
information now freely available, the positive law may seem more
democratic. However appealing, these intuitions about technology’s
impact on our concept of positive law do not accord with experience.
Recall our hypothetical person struggling to understand a dense cell
phone contract. Just because law’s text is now easier to access doesn’t
mean that it is now easier to understand. Technology may have opened up
law’s text to the multitude, but technology alone cannot explain what the
text says or how it is interpreted by those initiated into the lawyering class.
As we have shown with research, technology has created problems too. To
reiterate an earlier point, content without context is useless. Abundant,
cheap information now overwhelms us, and even accomplished lawyers
struggle to sort what is useful from what is not. The elite and mysterious
nature of law persists.
Nevertheless, we should not be discouraged. Law may not yet be as
democratic and open as we would like it to be, but still we can reflect upon
law to reimagine basic concepts. Just as we have reoriented metaphors to
advance our understanding of research, so too can we reimagine law to
better serve freedom and equality. Conceptual metaphor theory reminds us
that we can consciously change our traditions and our ideas. We can make
both new wine and new wineskins.
LAW IS TEXT

